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Abstract Pain is a highly salient and attention-demanding experience that moti-
vates people to act. We investigated the effect of pain on decision making by
delivering acute thermal pain to participants’ forearm while they made risky and
intertemporal choices involving money. Participants (n = 107) were more risk
seeking under pain than in a no-pain control condition when decisions involved
gains but not when they involved equivalent losses. Pain also resulted in greater
preference for immediate (smaller) over future (larger) monetary rewards. We
interpret these results as a motivation to offset the aversive, pain-induced state,
where monetary rewards become more appealing under pain than under no pain and
when delivered sooner rather than later. Our findings add to the long-standing
debate regarding the role of intuition and reflection in decision making.
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1 Introduction
How are our decisions affected in situations where we experience acute pain? The
majority (70%) of Europeans report having one or more physical pain experiences
per month (Vowles et al. 2014) and almost 20% report having chronic pain (Breivik
et al. 2006). Over the past few years, the pain reliever Acetaminophen has remained
the most or second most sold medication in the United States (Aitken et al. 2015).
These data suggest that pain is a highly prevalent condition that potentially
influences many everyday behaviors and decisions. In the present research, we
investigated the effect of pain on risky and intertemporal choices involving money.
Our findings have implications for understanding decision making in real life
environments, where decisions are frequently made under non-optimal conditions.
Dual-process theories hold that decision making is based on an interaction
between intuition (‘‘system 1’’) and reflection (‘‘system 2’’; Evans 2003; Evans and
Stanovich 2013; Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Intuitive processes are typically
characterized as fast, automatic, effortless, and emotional. Reflective processes are
characterized as slow, controlled, effortful, and deliberative. In this study, we used
pain as a means to temporarily inhibit the reflective system 2, thus making decisions
more intuitive and system 1 based. Pain is a suitable manipulation of system
1/system 2 processing, because painful stimuli are highly salient and attention-
demanding (Eccleston and Crombez 1999; Legrain et al. 2009). When in pain,
reducing or eliminating the pain becomes first priority and other tasks receive less
attention. Pain could thus be viewed as a form of cognitive load. Loewenstein
(2000) refers to pain as a ‘‘hot’’ feeling state that causes people to ‘‘take extreme
actions’’ (p. 429). The more intense the state, the greater the gap between what one
feels compelled to do (system 1) and what one should do based on the consequences
of one’s actions (system 2). The perception of pain also activates the insula, a brain
region that is known to respond to monetary (‘‘painful’’) losses (Kuhnen and
Knutson 2005; Paulus et al. 2003; Samanez-Larkin et al. 2007; Wu et al. 2012).
Research on chronic pain and decision making has mostly used the Iowa
Gambling Task (Bechara et al. 1994), an emotional learning task in which players
pick cards from decks of varying gain/loss ratios. Advantageous decks contain cards
with small gains and small losses. Disadvantageous decks contain larger gains but
also larger losses. Healthy subjects normally begin by sampling cards from each
deck and then learn to stick to the advantageous, low-risk decks and to avoid the
disadvantageous, high-risk ones. Patients with chronic pain keep choosing cards
from both kinds of decks and therefore end up with less money than controls
(Apkarian et al. 2004; Biagianti et al. 2012; Tamburin et al. 2014; Verdejo-Garcı´a
et al. 2009; Walteros et al. 2011). This learning impairment seems to be due to a
lack of somatic markers, because chronic pain patients’ physiological arousal does
not increase when they pick cards from disadvantageous decks, whereas it does in
healthy controls (Elvemo et al. 2014). Patients with chronic pain are also more risk
L. Koppel et al.
123
taking on tasks that do not involve a learning component, especially when high
potential gains (as opposed to losses) are at stake (Berger et al. 2014).
The prediction that follows from research on chronic pain is that acute pain, like
chronic pain, will increase risk taking overall. This prediction is somewhat in
contrast with dual-process theories, which predict that inhibiting system 2 increases
risk taking in the loss domain only, whereas it reduces risk taking in the gain
domain. In a study by Porcelli and Delgado (2009), participants immersed their
dominant hand in ice-cold water for 2 min, a procedure known as the cold-pressor
task, before completing a decision-making task in which they chose between either
two potential losses or two potential gains. The cold-pressor task is known to induce
stress, which should lead to more system 1 processing. Indeed, participants who
underwent the cold-pressor task were less risk taking in the gain domain but
(marginally) more risk taking for equivalent gambles in the loss domain. Similar
results have also been observed with time pressure (Kirchler et al. in press). An
important distinction between the present study and the one by Porcelli and Delgado
(2009) is that their participants experienced the painful stimulus before, rather than
during, the decision phase. Thus, the authors explain their results in terms of stress
rather than ongoing pain. In the present study, we investigated decisions made
during the experience of a painful stimulus. On the one hand, we believe that our
manipulation inhibits the reflective system 2 more effectively than common
manipulations such as cognitive load, time pressure, and stress. On the other hand,
pain has a unique neural signature (Wager et al. 2013), implying that its effect on
behavior and decision making might differ from the effect of other types of hot
system 1 states.
Another prediction from dual-process theories is that inhibition of system 2 leads
to a greater preference for immediate over future rewards, a phenomenon known as
temporal discounting. This prediction is supported by research showing that the
evolutionarily old limbic and paralimbic systems are activated when participants
choose immediate rewards, whereas evolutionarily newer prefrontal areas are
activated when they choose delayed rewards (McClure et al. 2004). Moreover,
cognitive load has been shown to lead to greater discounting of delayed monetary
rewards (Hinson et al. 2003), and heroin addicts in the ‘‘hot’’ state of drug craving
not only show a greater preference for immediate over delayed delivery of heroin
but also for immediate over delayed delivery of monetary rewards (Giordano et al.
2002). Given that pain could be viewed as a hot feeling state that reduces self-
control (Loewenstein 1996, 2000), participants in pain should show greater
preference for immediate over future rewards, even if those rewards are not directly
related to the pain. This prediction is in line with research showing that participants
who report greater anticipation of pain prior to painful experiences (which is linked
to pain sensitivity; Bran˜as-Garza et al. 2010) are more impatient for monetary
rewards (Bran˜as-Garza et al. 2012).
In the present study, pain was delivered at participants’ subjective pain threshold
while they made dichotomous decisions with real monetary consequences. We
explored the effect of pain on risky choice (both gains and losses) and intertemporal
choice. Participants completed the decision-making tasks both with and without
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pain (in counterbalanced order), which allowed us to explore the effect of pain both
between and within subjects.
2 Method
2.1 Participants and materials
109 participants (35% female; M age = 23.4 years, SD = 3.5) were recruited using
the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE; Greiner 2015)
at Linko¨ping University, Sweden. A sample-size calculation based on means and
standard deviations from a previous study from our lab (Kirchler et al. in press) and
with 70% power showed that 50 participants were needed in each condition. Data
collection continued until all scheduled experimental sessions for the week of the
100th participant had been completed. All participants gave their informed consent
prior to participation. Individuals were not allowed to participate if they were taking
anxiolytic, antidepressive, or pain relieving medication. Participants were paid 100
SEK (approx. 12 USD) as a show-up fee plus or minus the amount from one
randomly selected decision. Delayed payoffs from the intertemporal choice task
were paid using Swish, a free, popular smartphone app that facilitates immediate
money transfers between bank accounts. Participants who had not already installed
Swish on their phone were required to do so before participating in the study. Two
male participants were excluded due to technical problems during the experiment,
leaving 107 participants in the final sample.
Painful heat stimulation was delivered to the distal part of participants’ left dorsal
forearm using a 3 9 3 cm Thermal Stimulator Probe (Q-sense, Medoc). Prior to the
experiment, participants’ pain threshold for heat was determined by a procedure
following Perini et al. (2013), in which the thermode had a baseline temperature of
32 C and increased at a speed of 1 C/s. Participants’ task was to press a mouse
button positioned in their right hand when the stimulation reached the border
between painful and too painful. For safety reasons, the temperature never exceeded
50 C. After they had pressed, the temperature returned to baseline. The procedure
was repeated four times. The highest achieved temperature was selected as the pain
threshold (max. 49 C). Participants then completed a 1 min trial block in which the
temperature varied between their pain threshold and 2 C below the threshold, just
as it would during the experimental trials (see below). Participants were told that the
stimulation was meant to be painful but endurable and were allowed adjust to a
lower or higher temperature if they perceived the stimulation as too painful or not
painful enough, respectively. Pain thresholds after adjustments ranged between
40 C and 49 C (M = 48.07, SD = 1.38). Fifty-four participants had the
maximum pain threshold of 49 C. Pain thresholds did not differ as a function of
the order in which participants were in the pain and control conditions,
t(105) = .80, p = .425. A manipulation check was conducted on the last 56
participants, who indicated how painful they perceived the stimulation on a scale
from 1 (not at all painful) to 10 (extremely painful). This confirmed that the
stimulation was perceived as very painful (M = 8.43, SD = 1.36) and that the
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subjective experience of the stimulation did not differ as a function of the order of
conditions, t(54) = .56, p = .578.
2.2 Experimental design
We used a crossover design in which participants performed three decision-making
tasks twice: once with pain and once without pain. Participants thus served as their
own controls. The order of the tasks was the same for all participants, but the order
of the pain and control conditions was randomized between participants so that
about half the participants (n = 57, 32% female) were in the pain condition first and
the other half (n = 50, 40% female) were in the control condition first. In the pain
condition, painful heat stimulation as described above was delivered to participants’
left forearm continuously for 60 s while they completed each task. In the control
condition, the thermode was placed on participants’ forearm but the temperature
remained at baseline (32 C). Everything else was identical between conditions.
Each task lasted for 60 s and was followed by a break of at least 30 s during which
the thermode was removed from participants’ arm. Thus, pain was only delivered
during the decision phase. General instructions were given before the experiment
started and task-specific instructions were given before each task. Participants were
informed that one of their decisions would be randomly selected for actual payment.
The tasks were presented on a computer screen and were programmed in Qualtrics.
A translation of the complete instructions for the experiment is provided in the
Supplemental Materials.
2.2.1 Risky gains task
On each of five trials, participants chose between a safe option (receiving a sum of
money with certainty) and a risky option (receiving a sum of money with 50%
probability). Participants had 12 s to respond on each trial and could not proceed to
the next trial until the given time had elapsed. This was done to minimize potential
confounding effects of time pressure and response times.
2.2.2 Risky losses task
On each of five trials, participants chose between a safe option (losing a sum of
money with certainty) and a risky option (losing a sum of money with 50%
probability). Participants again had 12 s to respond on each trial.
2.2.3 Intertemporal choice task
On each of four1 trials, participants chose between receiving an immediate (smaller)
monetary reward and a delayed (larger) monetary reward. The immediate reward
1 We originally included a fifth question (20 s) in which participants indicated how much a sum of
money (1000 SEK in the first round and 100 SEK in the second) would be worth if given to them a month
from now. However, because 27% of participants failed to respond on time in the first round of the tasks,
we have omitted that question from our data analysis.
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was delivered either on the same day or the day after the experiment and the delayed
reward was delivered one, two, five, or six days following the experiment.
Participants had 10 s to respond on each trial.
2.3 Data analysis
We first performed paired samples t-tests to investigate whether the proportion of
risky and impatient choices, compared to the total number of trials in each task, was
greater in the pain condition than in the control condition. We then performed
regression analyses in order to confirm the results from the t-tests while also
controlling for age and gender. Our regression model for the risky choice tasks was
specified as follows:
yik ¼ b0 þ b1Painþ b2Round þ b3Ratioþ b4Xiþ 2ik ð1Þ
where the dependent variable yik is a dummy variable indicating whether participant
i chose the risky option in trial k. Pain is a dummy for the pain condition and Round
is a dummy for the second round of the tasks, i.e. the second time participants
performed the tasks. An alternative model also included the interaction term
Pain 9 Round, which allows the effect of pain to differ across the two task rounds.
Ratio is the ratio between the expected value of the risky option and the expected
value of the safe option on each trial (standardized). Xi is the control variables age
and gender. The model was estimated using OLS and standard errors were corrected
for clustering on the individual level.
Our regression model for the intertemporal choice task was identical to the model
above except the dependent variable yik was a dummy variable indicating whether
participant i chose the immediate option in trial k and Ratio was replaced with
Delay, which denotes the difference in days (one or five) between the immediate
and the delayed reward. Thus, the regression model for the intertemporal choice task
was specified as follows:
yik ¼ b0 þ b1Painþ b2Round þ b3Delayþ b4Xiþ 2ik ð2Þ
For all choice tasks, we also investigated whether the effect of pain differed between
male and female participants. To do this, we performed regression analyses using
the models specified above where we included the interaction term Pain 9 Female,
which allows the effect of pain to differ across genders.
We also estimated risk aversion and discounting parameters for the pain and
control conditions. For the estimation of risk aversion, we assumed constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) and the following utility function:
u xð Þ ¼
x1r
1  r if x 0
 xð Þ
1r






where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and x is the monetary outcome.
With this parameterization, r = 0 denotes risk-neutral behavior, r[ 0 denotes risk
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aversion (risk-seeking behavior), and r\ 0 denotes risk-seeking behavior (risk
aversion) for gains (losses). Using this utility function, we denoted the expected
utility of each alternative (A) as:
EU Að Þ ¼
X
x2A
p xð Þu xð Þ ð4Þ
We calculated the difference in expected utility between the safe option (S) and the
risky option (R) using:
DEU ¼ EU Sð Þ  EU Rð Þ ð5Þ
The likelihood function is:
L ¼ U DEUð Þ if Safe
1  U DEUð Þ if Risky

ð6Þ
where U is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
The likelihood function was estimated using maximum likelihood with the Broy-
den-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm. We estimated the average risk factor for
the whole sample in the pain and control conditions in the following way (allowing
for heterogeneity in risk preferences):
br ¼ r0 þ a0Painþ a1Round ð7Þ
where r0 represents the estimate of the constant, Pain is a dummy for the pain
condition, and Round is a dummy for the second round of the task. An alternative
model also included the interaction term Pain 9 Round, which allows the effect of
pain to differ across the two task rounds. Standard errors were clustered at the
individual level. Estimates were provided separately for gains and losses in order to
allow for different curvature of the utility function for positive and negative
outcomes.
For the discount factor, we assume exponential discounting and the following
function for discounted utility:
u xð Þ ¼ dtut xð Þ ð8Þ
where d denotes the discount factor and t denotes the number of days until the
outcome will be realized. In function (8) we assume that the utility function at time
t, ut xð Þ, takes form as in (3) with estimated average risk factor as described above.
Using (8) we calculated discounted utility separately for the immediate and the
delayed reward. We then calculated the difference in discounted utility between the
delayed (D) and the early (E) options using:
DU ¼ U Dð Þ  U Eð Þ ð9Þ
We can then describe the likelihood function as:
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L ¼ U DUð Þ if Delayed
1  U DUð Þ if Early

ð10Þ
where U is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
We used the same estimation method as for risk preferences. Similarly, we esti-
mated the average discount factor for the whole sample in the pain and control
conditions, allowing for heterogeneity in time preferences:
bd ¼ d0 þ a0Painþ a1Round ð11Þ
where d0 represents the estimate of the constant, Pain is a dummy for the pain
condition, and Round is a dummy for the second round of the task. An alternative
model also included the interaction term Pain 9 Round, which allows the effect of
pain to differ across the two task rounds. Standard errors were clustered at the
individual level.
We finally considered data at the individual level by investigating whether pain
had the same effect on all individuals in each task and whether individuals who
changed their behavior in response to pain on one task also changed their behavior
in a similar fashion on the other tasks. For the latter, we calculated the difference in
the proportion of risky and impatient choices in the pain condition compared to the
control condition, for each individual and task. We then performed Pearson
correlations of the difference scores to explore the relationship between choices in
the three tasks.
3 Results
3.1 The effect of pain on risky choice
Figure 1a displays the proportion of participants’ risky choices compared to the
total number of trials in each condition (pain vs. control) and domain (gain vs. loss;
for trial-by-trial results, see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). A paired
samples t test showed that the proportion of risky choices in the gain domain was
greater in the pain condition than in the control condition, Mpain = .68 (95% CI
[.63, .74]), Mcontrol = .63 (95% CI [.58, .69]), t(106) = 2.06, p = .042, d = .12.
The regression analyses confirm this finding (see Table 1). That is, participants were
more likely to choose the risky option in the pain condition than in the control
condition, b = .049, p = .035. Age, gender, and Round (i.e., whether it was the first
or second time participants performed the task) had no significant effect on
decisions. However, there was a significant interaction between Pain and Round,
indicating that participants who were in the pain condition first were on average
more risk-seeking than participants who were in the control condition first. We
return to this interaction later. There was no evidence that the effect of pain differed
between the genders (see Table S2 in the Supplemental Material). The estimated
parameter of risk aversion in the gain domain, when controlling for Round, was .133
in the pain condition and .146 in the control condition. This difference was not
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statistically significant, p = .348 (see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). A
paired samples t test found no difference in response times between the pain and
control conditions, Mpain = 4.23 s (95% CI [3.93, 4.53]), Mcontrol = 4.32 s (95% CI
[4.05, 4.58]), t(106) = –.53, p = .599, d = –.05.
In the loss domain, there was no statistically significant difference in the
proportion of risky choices between the two conditions, Mpain = .36 (95% CI [.30,
.42]), Mcontrol = .33 (95% CI [.28, 39]), t(106) = 1.00, p = .322, d = .07. The
regression analyses did not find a significant effect either (see Table 1). That is,
participants were not more likely to choose the risky option in the pain condition
than in the control condition, b = .021, p = .400. There was, however, a significant
effect of gender, such that women were more likely than men to choose the risky
option, b = .116, p = .020. Age and Round had no significant effect on decisions
and there was no significant interaction between pain and Round or between pain
and gender (see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). The estimated parameter of
risk aversion in the loss domain, after controlling for Round, was .136 in the
pain condition and .137 in the control condition. This difference was not statistically
significant, p = .976 (see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). There was
no difference in response times between the pain and control conditions,
Mpain = 4.48 s (95% CI [4.19, 4.76]), Mcontrol = 4.58 s (95% CI [4.27, 4.89]),
t(106) = –.57, p = .569, d = –.06.
In short, the results from the risky choice tasks suggest that acute pain increases
risk seeking in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain. However, there was also
a significant interaction between pain and the order in which participants were in the
pain and control conditions—that is, in the gain domain, participants who were in
the pain condition first were always more risk seeking than participants who were in
the control condition first. An additional analysis examined only the first round of
each task (i.e., the first time participants completed each task), where choices were
not influenced by choices from previous rounds. Results are presented separately for
each trial in Fig. 2 (see also Table S4 in the Supplemental Material). An
Fig. 1 Proportion of participants’ a risky and b impatient choices as a function of condition (pain vs.
control), with error bars showing 95% confidence intervals. *p\ .10, **p\ .05, ***p\ .01
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independent samples t-test showed that the overall proportion of risky choices in the
gain domain was significantly greater in the pain condition than in the control
condition, Mpain = .74 (95% CI [.67, .81]), Mcontrol = .55 (95% CI [.47, .64]),
t(105) = 3.47, p\ .001, d = .69. The difference in the proportion of risky choices
in the loss domain was not statistically significant, Mpain = .37 (95% CI [.28, .45]),
Mcontrol = .30 (95% CI [.22, .38]), t(105) = 1.09, p = .280, d = .23. The
regression analyses corroborate these findings (see Table 1). That is, pain increased
the likelihood of choosing the risky option in the gain domain, b = .184, p = .001,
but not in the loss domain, b = .072, p = .160. In the gain domain, the estimated
parameter of risk aversion was .088 in the pain condition and .190 in the control
condition. This difference was statistically significant, p\ .001. In the loss domain,
the estimated parameter of risk aversion was .146 in the pain condition and .124 in
the control condition. This difference was not statistically significant, p = .452 (see
Table 1 Regression analyses of risky and intertemporal choices
Risky gains Risky losses Intertemporal choice
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Pain .049** .184*** .021 .072 .071*** .084
(.023) (.055) (.025) (.056) (.018) (.058)
Round .011 .146*** .028 .079 .034* .047
(.023) (.054) (.025) (.052) (.018) (.058)
Pain 9 round –.270*** –.101 –.027
(.099) (.099) (.116)
Female –.078 –.064 .116** .121** –.033 –.032
(.049) (.051) (.049) (.049) (.056) (.057)
Age .003 .002 .003 .002 –.006 –.006
(.008) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.007) (.007)
Ratio .202*** .202*** –.194*** –.194***
(.014) (.014) (.016) (.016)
Delay .076*** .076***
(.009) (.009)
Constant .577*** .536*** .207 .192 .122 .118
(.193) (.193) (.227) (.226) (.167) (.170)
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the
individual level in parentheses). For the risky choice tasks, the dependent variable is a dummy variable
indicating whether participants chose the risky option. For the intertemporal choice task, the dependent
variable is a dummy variable indicating whether they chose the immediate reward. ‘‘Pain’’ is a dummy for
the pain condition. ‘‘Round’’ is a dummy for the second round of the tasks, i.e. the second time the
participants performed the tasks. ‘‘Pain 9 Round’’ is the interaction between the pain condition and the
task round, allowing the effect of pain to differ across the two task rounds. ‘‘Female’’ is a gender dummy.
‘‘Age’’ is the participant’s age in years. ‘‘Ratio’’ is the ratio between the expected value of the risky option
and the expected value of the safe option on each trial (standardized). ‘‘Delay’’ is the difference in days (1
or 5) between the immediate and the delayed reward in the intertemporal choice task
* p\ .10, ** p\ .05, *** p\ .01
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Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). Thus, the between-subjects results confirm
the finding that pain increases risk seeking for gains but not for losses.
3.2 The effect of pain on intertemporal choice
Figure 1b shows the proportion of participants’ impatient choices in the pain vs.
control condition compared to the total number of trials in the intertemporal choice
task (for trial-by-trial results, see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). A paired
samples t-test showed that the proportion of impatient choices was greater in the
pain condition than in the control condition, Mpain = .28 (95% CI [.22, .35]),
Mcontrol = .22 (95% CI [.22, .27]), t(106) = 3.84, p = .0002, d = .16. The results
from the regression analyses corroborate this finding (see Table 1). That is,
participants were more likely to choose the impatient option in the pain condition
than in the control condition, b = .071, p =\ .001. Age, gender, and Round had no
significant effect on the proportion of impatient choices and there was no interaction
between pain and Round or between pain and gender (see Table S2 in the
Supplemental Material). The estimated discount factor, after controlling for Round,
was .969 in the pain condition and .971 in the control condition. This difference was
statistically significant, p\ .001. There was no difference in response times
between the pain and control conditions, Mpain = 3.62 s (95% CI [3.38, 3.48]),
Mcontrol = 3.71 s (95% CI [3.48, 3.93]), t(106) = –.58, p = .566, d = –.06.
Results from the first round of the intertemporal choice tasks are presented in
Fig. 2c (see also Table S4 in Supplemental Material). The difference in the
proportion of impatient choices was in the same direction as in the above analyses
but was not statistically significant, Mpain = .27 (95% CI [.19, .35]), Mcontrol = .19
(95% CI [.11, .27]), t(105) = 1.46, p = .147, d = .27. The regression analyses did
not yield a significant effect either, b = .084, p = .144, (see Table 1). The
estimated discount factor was .969 in the pain condition and .971 in the control
condition. This difference was not statistically significant, p = .119 (see Table S3 in
the Supplemental Material). However, the non-significance might just reflect the
Fig. 2 Percent frequency of a risky choices in the gain domain, b risky choices in the loss domain, and
c impatient choices in the intertemporal choice task, presented per trial as a function of condition (pain vs.
control) for the first round of each task, with error bars showing 95% confidence intervals
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decrease in statistical power when investigating between-subjects differences only.
In contrast to the risky choice tasks, the order of conditions did not significantly
influence the effect of pain on decision making in the intertemporal choice task.
Thus, we conclude that pain increases preferences for immediate over future
rewards.
3.3 Individual differences in the effect of pain across tasks
We found no evidence that the same individuals were driving the effect across all
tasks, because the pain vs. control difference scores for the three tasks were only
weakly correlated at best (gain and loss, r = -.181, p = .063; gain and
intertemporal choice, r = -.071, p = .467; loss and intertemporal choice,
r = .175, p = .074). Thus, we conclude that there was not just one subgroup of
participants whose decisions were influenced by the painful stimulation. See
Figure S1 in the Supplemental Material for a graphical depiction of the effect of
pain on each task at the individual level.
4 Discussion
Pain is a highly aversive and attention-demanding experience (Eccleston and
Crombez 1999; Legrain et al. 2009). Although responses to pain have evolutionarily
adaptive value, performance on cognitively demanding tasks such as decision
making may be compromised. Here we showed that acute physical pain influences
risky and intertemporal choices involving money. Participants experiencing a
painful stimulus were more risk seeking for gains but not for losses and showed
greater preferences for immediate (smaller) over future (larger) monetary rewards
than participants experiencing a non-painful stimulus. We interpret these results as a
motivation to compensate for the negative state induced by pain.
The results indicate that pain increases risk seeking for monetary gains but not
for monetary losses. Although in line with previous research on chronic pain
patients (Apkarian et al. 2004; Berger et al. 2014; Biagianti et al. 2012; Elvemo
et al. 2014; Tamburin et al. 2014; Verdejo-Garcı´a et al. 2009; Walteros et al. 2011),
these findings partly go against dual-process theories, which predict that inhibition
of system 2 leads to greater reliance on automatic biases such as the reflection effect
of prospect theory (Evans 2003; Evans and Stanovich 2013; Kahneman and
Frederick 2002; Kirchler et al. in press; Porcelli and Delgado 2009). Thus, our
findings suggest that pain does more than inhibit the reflective system 2—it
produces risk seeking behavior for potential rewards. This suggestion is supported
by previous research showing that pain increases the motivation to obtain a
monetary reward, as indicated by faster response times in the monetary incentive
delay (MID) task during pain than during a control condition (Gandhi et al. 2013).
Seeking risky rewards may even be an adaptive response to pain, because monetary
gains can reduce the subjective intensity and unpleasantness of a painful experience
(Becker et al. 2013). Thus, a risky choice in the present study could be interpreted as
an attempt to relieve pain.
L. Koppel et al.
123
Pain also increased preferences for immediate (smaller) over future (larger)
rewards. These results are in line both with dual-process approaches to decision
making and with previous evidence that monetary rewards can offset the pain-
induced negative state (Becker et al. 2013). If monetary rewards act as pain
relievers, and pain is experienced temporarily at the moment the decision is made,
then it makes sense to choose an immediate over a delayed reward. After all, a pain
reliever is most useful in a moment of pain. These findings have implications for
understanding how ‘‘hot’’ feeling states influence decision making. Feeling states
such as pain have previously been predicted to only influence decisions that are
directly related to those states (Loewenstein 1996). For example, drug addicts
temporally discount drugs to a greater extent than other kinds of rewards (Giordano
et al. 2002). However, the current study shows that the hot state of pain influences
temporal discounting of money, a reward that is not directly related to pain.
Our general findings that pain influences risk seeking and impatience can be
linked to a literature on the role of incidental emotions in decision making.
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) noted that sad participants were more risk seeking
whereas anxious participants were less risk seeking than control participants and
suggested that emotions may have different effects on judgments and decisions
depending on their informational content and implicitly activated goals. Feelings of
sadness can be interpreted as a lack of something rewarding, which activates the
goal of reward-seeking. Feelings of fear or anxiety involve uncertainty and lack of
control, which activate the goal of uncertainty reduction. In line with this ‘‘mood
repair’’ account, anticipation of painful, as opposed to non-painful, electric shocks
has been found to reduce risk taking in an investment task (Cohn et al. 2015).
Furthermore, activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum
predict choices in a risk task in the absence of threat, whereas activity in the insula
predicts choices in the presence of threat (Engelmann et al. 2015). It should be noted
that these studies involve anticipation of painful shocks, which are short-lived and
induce a state of anxiety and uncertainty. In contrast, the present study involved
continuous delivery of thermal stimulation, which induces an ongoing state of pain
but which lacks the uncertainty component. This difference between ongoing, actual
pain and anticipation of painful shock might explain why we observed an effect of
experienced pain on choices but Cohn et al. (2015) did not. Furthermore, a
speculative interpretation of our findings that is in line with the mood repair
literature is that pain induces a negative emotional state and that participants attempt
to repair their mood by opting for risker but higher reward options or rewards that
are delivered closer in time.
A limitation of the present study is that the choice tasks were presented in the
same order for all participants (i.e., risky gains, risky losses, intertemporal choice).
We therefore cannot rule out the possibility of order effects. For instance, the reason
we did not find a significant effect of pain in the loss domain could be that
participants habituated to the pain and were more familiar with the type of choice
task. However, we did observe an effect in the intertemporal choice task even
though it was placed last in the experiment. Moreover, Berger et al. (2014) found
that patients with chronic pain were more risk seeking than control participants, but
only for gains and not for losses, which is in line with our findings. A second
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limitation is the possibility that only individuals with a high tolerance for pain
signed up to participate. It is unclear how such self-selection bias may have
influenced our results. If we were to speculate, it seems most likely that the effect of
pain is stronger among individuals who did not sign up, because anticipation of pain
has been shown to be positively correlated with both sensitivity to pain (Bran˜as-
Garza et al. 2010) and impatience for monetary rewards (Bran˜as-Garza et al. 2012).
Future research needs to identify the exact processes behind the effects observed
in the present study. For instance, does pain influence the value function or the
probability weighting function of prospect theory? Furthermore, in the present
study, we compared the influence of ‘‘hot’’ (painful) and ‘‘cold’’ (non-painful) states
on decision-making while keeping the decisions constant. However, pain can also
result from the decision itself, as when an individual experiences a monetary loss
(Kuhnen and Knutson 2005; Paulus et al. 2003; Samanez-Larkin et al. 2007;
Va¨stfja¨ll et al. 2016; Wu et al. 2012). Probability weighting for painful electric
shocks has been found to be similar to probability weighting for monetary losses
(Berns et al. 2007), Future research should investigate the relative contributions of
incidental pain, which is unrelated to the decision at hand, and integral pain, which
results from the decision itself. Additionally, experiences such as social rejection
(Eisenberger et al. 2003) and economic insecurity (Chou et al. 2016) can feel
physically painful. The question remains whether the effect of pain on risky and
intertemporal choice generalizes to pain from non-physical sources. Finally, it
would be good if future replication studies were conducted, especially for risky
choices given that our results were less conclusive for this domain when modeled
within subject.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates a behavioral effect of acute,
physical pain on economic decision making. Participants were more risk seeking
(for gains, but not for losses) and more impatient when experiencing a painful,
compared to a non-painful, stimulus. It is possible that the effect is even greater in
real-life settings outside the lab, where individuals have little to no control over the
pain they experience and where they may be less aware that the pain influences their
behavior and decisions. Thus, our findings contribute to the understanding of
decision making in everyday life, which is filled with painful experiences.
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